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Crime as a Cultural Problem. The Relevance of Perceptions of Corruption to Crime Prevention. A Comparative Cultural Study in the EU-Accession States Bulgaria and Romania, the EU-Candidate States Turkey and Croatia and the EU-States Germany, Greece and United Kingdom

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Perceptions of Corruption in Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Croatia, Greece, Germany and the United Kingdom

A Content Analysis of Interviews from Target Group Police



BULGARIA

Target Group Police and Prosecutors

Definitions

The representatives of the bodies that investigate corruption-related crimes define the phenomenon broadly as an act in which the political process is distorted in favour of certain private interests at the expense of the common, public interest. This generally confirms our hypothesis from the first stage, that the prosecutors and the police as a group, have a different perception from the judiciary, perception which brings them closer to groups like the media and the politicians. Our respondents referred to a definition used by some international organisations such as the International Criminal Court, according to which the really dangerous forms of corruption are in the legislative process and in high-level governance. These forms are considered to be more dangerous in comparison to everyday corruption, since they have, above all, hidden accumulative effects. This means that the negative effects of current corruption deals might not be immediate, but might appear years later, for example in cases where environmental standards are not respected as a result of corruption.

Origin and Causes

The lack of certain values in Bulgaria is considered to be one of the major reasons for the existence of corruption. The church and religion in general, which normally have positive effects on crime prevention, have a limited influence in the country. Another set of causes combines factors determined by the Communist past and the transition period, such as the weak state and weak judicial system in particular.

If we compare the views of this group on the issue of the origins of corruption with the views of the judiciary, an important difference emerges: the prosecutors, apart from the issue of social values, stress also the *political* origins of corruption, and do not shy from making political in their essence judgements, relating the phenomenon to the “Communist past” and the “transition”. It needs to be said that references to such “key words” have a specific political meaning in Bulgarian public discourse; usually sympathisers of the right of the centre political forces will speak negatively about the communist past; people dissatisfied with the mainstream parties and sympathising for new populist parties will normally depict the “transition process” in negative terms, stressing its corruption and injustice.

Size and Scope

Similarly to respondents from the other target groups the representatives of this target group believe that corruptions is an almost immeasurable phenomenon. The quantitative studies that try to detect the numbers of the corruption transactions, cannot measure the social cost of separate transactions, which is the most important aspect in this respect. At the same time, respondents perceive corruption as present in all segments of society, justifying this conclusion on the basis of personal observations and experience. The state of total corruption is explained with the fact that the systems of politics and governance, which are of key importance for the functioning of the society, are corrupt themselves. Since corruption is considered to be “an infection,” it easily affects the whole social organism.



Anti-corruption Measures

Similarly to the journalists the representatives of the Police and the Prosecutor's Office believe that it is unrealistic to expect that the political system can do something to limit or prevent corruption, since the way in which it functions is determined by the corruption exchanges. The state has established formal anti-corruption bodies and structures, but they have no real powers and function on a very general level.

One way to tackle corruption would be to establish Ethical Commissions at all public institutions that have the power to investigate every single complaint of corruption filed by the citizens and companies. Another way would be to establish special investigative institutions to deal exclusively with corruption cases. In order to be effective, these institutions need to be independent and capable to investigate separate cases of corruption. This would seriously threaten the politicians' interests and therefore it is less likely that they would allow for such institutions to exist.

The respondents from this target groups are sceptical about the possible anti-corruption roles of political parties, the media, the NGOs, and the business circles. The political parties are seen as the major engine of corruption in society and therefore it cannot be expected that they would be the ones to initiate anti-corruption reforms. The media are seen largely dependent on various political and business interests and therefore incapable of investigating and revealing cases of corruption to the public in a way that might bring real change. NGOs are perceived as similarly inefficient, as in most cases they are related to certain political parties and do not truly represent the civil society in the country.



ROMANIA

In the Romanian report analysis was based in a comparison between perceptions of corruption regarding different fields of the problem without distinguishing in different target groups. For more information please see the Romanian report in “Scientific Report Romania 2007” in this web site.



TURKEY

The Analysis of the Target Group Police

Corruption is any act committed contrary to laws, regulations, the principles of social life and individual rights and freedoms, in order to receive or grant advantages by way of either using or not using one's own power. Corrupt act can take place both in public and private spheres.

Still, corruption is a vague concept. There is no clear cut, common definition of corruption such that, in some cases even giving or receiving a tiny gift can be considered as a corrupt act. However, gift exchange may not be in the limits of corruption depending on its value and reason. Thus, the prophet Mohammed recommends to "give gifts to your friends and the beloved ones". The acts such as offering lunch, presenting gifts or giving pocket money in religious and national occasions should not be considered as bribery. These kinds of practices should be thought as the support given to the protector by the protected.

Corruption is because of

- unemployment,
- low income level of public officials,
- lack of meritocracy,
- lack of punishment,
- lack of evidence due to reciprocity of benefits,
- the desire to earn easy money and to avoid responsibilities,
- solidly reflexes (to favor the members of one's own social group),
- The institutional heritage that the Republic of Turkey took over from the Ottoman Empire. (Among the top administrative cadre in the Ottoman Empire, the idea to become wealthy by using its authority was internalized due to the lack of any formal, legal structure. Despite the penal and civil codes and the modern state institutions imported from the West, even today, this behavioral pattern is still valid for the administrators, as if it is genetically coded.)

The level of corruption increased to a great extent hand in hand with the post-1980 liberalization process. Financial as well as trade liberalization without sufficient legal infrastructure provided immense opportunities (fictitious export, credit embezzlement and state biddings) for people who wanted to become rich in an easy way. Especially, as a consequence of decentralization process that the AKP government started in early 2000s, local administrative units had greater fields of maneuver open to corruption via,

- abusing the legal loopholes,
- creative accounting through Municipal Economic Enterprises,
- receiving illegal grants and distributing them to the local electorate in forms of food supply, coal, etc. (This policy is thought to provide AKP a considerable amount of votes in July 2007 General Elections and yet still blaming without evidence should be avoided.)

As for the financing of political parties, it is believed that the aid received from the State Treasury is more than sufficient. Politicians should finance themselves and if they receive



external financial support, it should be overtly recorded and declared as is the case in the USA.

The immunities of MPs must be limited to freedom of speech. For petty offences however, they should certainly be abolished. However, in the current situation politicians are not expected to lift the immunities since they seem to be in need of them.

Business world, media and politics are in the first three ranks of corruption scale and the failures in other target groups including police, jurisdiction and NGOs are more often individual and in trivial amounts than systematic.

Politicians: Politicians play a significant role in corruption. In spite of their great executive power, they do not have to render account of their deeds to any inspection body but the Supreme Court.

Judiciary: The state attorneys and the judges are also enjoying the same asymmetry. The Turkish Penal Code bestows significant initiative to judges (the penalty for a crime X is for example up to 2 to 4 years of imprisonment, the judge may choose to opt for 2 or 4 years according to his discretionary power). Hypothetically, this discretionary power can be misused in exchange for personal benefits. It is a routine that judges apply to experts for subjects out of their professional knowledge. The reports prepared by experts frequently constitute the reference points for verdicts. An expert, if he is corrupt, is very well capable of mislead the judge. Law is applied because it is the Law not because it is fair. Sometimes people become victims of such corrupt experts. Nevertheless, ultimately, there is poetic justice.

Even though suffering from low salaries, overwork, even sometimes death threats, the members of jurisdiction involved in corruption is relatively very few in numbers. However, due to the values that the judicial system represents, any corruption case belonging to this target group would erode the trust relationship between the ordinary citizen and the State. Members of the judicial system, for this reason should not worry about their financial status whatsoever. U.K could constitute a good example for Turkey in this context.

Police: On the other hand, state institutions should not be held responsible for corrupt behaviors committed by few of their officials. Internal regulations of police department are very strict and when proven, the person involved in corruption is immediately dismissed. The police is unfairly blamed for bribery and other types of corruption by the public opinion. On the contrary, the police department is the most sensitive institution about corruption prevention. Compared to 20 – 30 years ago, there is great difference in the police department today. Certain acts considered natural in the past are defined as wrongdoings now. It should be also be noted that the State must not create the circumstances that lead to bribery. If there was still bribery in the police department despite reasonable improvements in salaries, the situation then must be seriously inspected and perpetrators must be severely punished.

Media: Media has a huge impact, therefore must abide by certain ethical codes while utilizing it. They have the means to bring up the problems into sharp relief of the political authorities.



Economy: The ultimate motivation for some businessmen is to get their work done regardless of ethical concerns. This mode of behavior has corrosive influence upon State institutions. At this point, reducing bureaucracy becomes an essential issue.

Civil Society: NGOs are praised for raising consciousness among state institutions.


Conclusion (on prevention)

As for the EU integration process in preventing corruption, it is emphasized that the implementation of laws is much more important than solely making them. The process itself is more significant than the full membership. EU means contemporary civilization, high quality of life, transparency and accountability.

Given the fact that, in the basis of ethical problems lies ignorance, Turkey should primarily, focus on improving its education system both qualitatively and quantitatively. Adoption of EU criteria would not mean anything without the man power who would meet them.

In the mean time, bureaucratic processes should be reduced and living conditions of government employees should be improved. Institutional culture should be promoted in government agencies via institutional training, and efficient internal inspection.

CROATIA TARGET GROUP POLICE



GERMANY

Target Group Police

Outline

The evaluation of the interviews will be carried out in the following steps: Beginning with a discussion of the complexity of corruption, that is its complex socio-cultural nature going beyond what the penal law sanctions, emphasis is then placed on the importance for the criminal police work of investigations bearing on the 'environment' of the 'case': the various rationalities underlying corrupt conduct. After drawing attention to the most important of them the analysis focuses on two cornerstones of a structural investigative approach that takes into account the social-ethical aspects of the phenomenon: raising initial suspicion and seeking probable causes. After that the analysis moves on to point out certain requirements police investigators must have in order to meet the challenges in view of how cumbersome investigation procedures in the field of fighting corruption usually are. Personal qualities like passion, tenacity, skills to reconstruct the 'logic' on the basis of common sense raise the effectiveness of corruption prevention for they help to a) focus on the 'incubation phase' of the case and b) deliver the general attorney plausible accounts of and utilisable material for the case to be prosecuted.

Analysis

Contrary to what the existing anti-corruption law seems to refer to, there is no 'corruption' as a technical term designating a determinate offence in the work of criminologists and the police investigation officers. In contrast to the everyday use of the word, everybody having a vague notion of what corruption consists in, the experts in the field of prosecution restrain it to prosecutable offences like bribery, accepting or granting (undue) advantages etc. [P1: 127-134]. However, this does not mean that the criminal prosecution authorities are not aware that the everyday notion of corruption as a *collective term* can be deployed to widen the scope of criminal facts. This is possible in two ways:

- a) Although not a judicial term itself it can help discern probably criminal facts attached to the 'core' offences of bribery, etc. [P1: 182-185], and
- b) Despite its vagueness it may substantially contribute to reconstructing the criminal case by drawing attention to activities that usually are necessary or sufficient preconditions of criminal action [P2: 410-416].

Either way the term 'corruption' supplements in a certain sense the targeted prosecution of criminal offences for it *broadens the field of investigative attention* to either other sanctionable aspects of the case or the 'environment' that substantiates corrupt conduct. The latter in turn has various facets:

1. For one thing 'environmental' grounds refer to those capacities and dispositions (cleverness, strategic thinking, the power to assert oneself, etc.) that underlie efficient and success-oriented economic action [P2: 499-501 and 512-515]. Of course such subjective abilities for economic success do not *per se* provide necessary preconditions for the possibility of corrupt conduct. What must be added in order to raise the factor of necessity in the relation between economic action and corruption propensities is a certain *habitus* that adopts the economic logic: the commitment to permanently raising efficiency. The unwavering compliance with the demands of relentlessly optimising performance data



seems to deliver a useful criterion for distinguishing petty from large-scale corruption: while the former is situated in (everyday, situative) exchange relations, the latter presupposes behavioural patterns demanded by the entrepreneurial ethics of extended accumulation. Thus for example in large corporations career advancement is almost concomitant with character qualities or professional status in which the internalised imperatives of optimisation combined with a cunning power of self-assertion can initiate rule-violating conduct [P2: 554-571].

Nevertheless it is not always discernible to what extent such subjective motivational factors can be dissociated from the economic imperatives of optimising efficiency und raising performance, if at all [P2: 343-349]. Regarding large-scale corporations it is not unusual to find cases in which the personal identification with the management objectives can function as a legitimate reason for the drift to corrupt conduct, for example when secret accounts are kept for potential bribes of foreign companies or officials. In such cases the subjective motives of acting unlawfully appeal to the long-term economic interests of the corporation, the positive effects on employment foreign investments will have for the company home and the benefits for the country as a whole in global competition – the end justifies the means or *corruption for the sake of...* [P2: 214-222; 389-393; 672-678]. Regarding the ends, the latter need not always appeal to the pressure of meeting performance criteria: it suffices, if it legitimises itself by pointing out the inescapability in order to keep business going [P1: 438-441]. Moreover, in cases of large-scale corruption it is not easy to pin down exactly those moments of the whole process that instantiate sanctionable wrong-doing or show beyond doubt that certain laws were violated [P2: 262-265]. The reason for this lies in the fact that corrupt conduct is part and parcel of the organisational system of doing business [P2: 342-349].

2. The motivational grounds of corrupt conduct need not necessarily be considered inseparable from the economic logic of performance optimisation at all costs. In the field of experience of police investigation work there is another way of seeing the motivation to corruption as being sustained by a certain ‘logic’. This time it is not the internalised demands of the economic ethics of efficiency, rather a self-sustaining process that once set in motion gains increasingly momentum – like an avalanche [P1: 379-393]. What is otherwise regarded as belonging to the sphere of large-scale corruption regains its everyday character, because in this case the motivation is rooted in certain basic behavioural patterns. By the latter is meant that self-sustaining mechanism that can also simply be called *addiction*. Compared to the art of economic causation previously discussed, this way of attributing corrupt conduct to certain traits of human nature [P1: 401-405] has the advantage that it helps explain cases of rule-trespassing behaviour that cannot be seen as necessitated by the demands of raising economic performance. Seen from this perspective the morals of individual action can be dissociated even from the usual motives of money-making. As certain corruption cases with the involvement of higher ranked managers clearly show that personal enrichment or even simply becoming richer do not play any role in deciding to continue or partake in corrupt action. What in such cases often matters though is the feeling of exercising power [P2: 648-658].
3. Last but not least, to the ‘environment’ of corruption offences include not only the motivations of the individuals involved, but also the *societal perceptions* of to what extent or even whether corruption takes place at all. In northern European countries like Germany corruption was still considered well into the 90s to be something that had to do



with the cultural mentalities in southern Europe pertained only of the cultural-political mentalities obtaining for example in south Europe [P1: 57-59]. Although there was an awareness of situative, petty corruption taking place, the dominant mode of perception restrained it to being a problem mainly with foreigners thus ignoring the structural causes of home-grown, large-scale corruption.

Taking all these 'informal' or 'environmental' factors into account that determines what can and must be criminally prosecuted means for the police anti-corruption work to set up a *structural investigative approach* [P1: 221-230]. This shall take into account to the strategies deployed in fighting organised crime in that it focuses on crime as culture, i.e. rooted in socio-cultural milieus and following certain socio-ethical patterns. Fighting corruption should combine the criminal with the ethical aspects of the phenomenon [P1: 556-558]. Furthermore such an approach can meet the challenge posed by the diagnostics of corrupt conduct as motivationally intertwined with either the economic logic optimising efficiency at all costs or aspects of human behaviour such as creed, insatiability, addiction, and the like. Because more often than not the criminal police concentrate on facts that are as such objects of juridical prosecution the structural approach helps compensate for this so to speak 'factual positivism' by tracking down the *processuality* of corrupt conduct.

The process of which the outcome is the concrete offence/crime must of course be reconstructed. Therefore the question around which the structural approach first revolves is to pin down some moments of the (potential) case of corruption that warrant suspicion. Thus *raising initial suspicion* [P1: 219-222] proves to be a cornerstone for both the investigation of the motivational causes of corrupt conduct and the effective prevention as well. At the same time the focus on initial suspicion highlights another aspect of (tackling) corruption that is closely connected with the aforementioned societal perceptions of the phenomenon: Raising initial suspicion means *that the way the actors working in the field of criminal investigation perceive corrupt conduct taking place is instrumental for a potential corruption 'case' that is subsequently taken up by the prosecution authorities*. What counts as a suspicious moment depends essentially on the investigating person perceiving some events/actions as necessarily being followed up by criminal offences. Besides, raising public sensibility to perceive suspicious conduct also is among the tasks of the structural approach. Thus the work of the criminal police should be accompanied by a kind of public enlightenment [P1: 460-470], that is continuous publicity work.

The factor of perceiving some facts as suspicious, i.e. susceptible to criminal investigation, proves frequently all the more obvious, particularly when one considers the relations between the criminal police investigation and the judicial prosecution carried out by the general attorneys. Here more often than not the question revolves around the issue whether the suspicious moments picked out by the investigating officer can be acknowledged by the attorney as *substantial evidence* necessitating the opening of corruption proceedings [P1: 238-244; P2: 147-151]. In this way the perception of some facts as deserving investigation and prosecution is in the view of the police anti-corruption work inextricably connected with an analogous perception of the judicial authority that is accordingly willing to see sufficient evidence in these facts.

The question of how to start from (police investigation) or how substantial the initial suspicion can be from a judicial standpoint can only be answered on a case to case basis. Nevertheless there seems to be a criterion that qualifies certain events as deserving police and



judicial attention: *conspicuous regularity* [P1: 322-328]. When for example the rules of an open call for tenders are conspicuously ignored in communal economic management, i.e. certain local contractors are regularly favoured, then such facts can substantiate the initial suspicion – though as such they do not immediately call for penal prosecution. Such cases validate the insight that because corruption is a social phenomenon that transcends codified laws it is up to the investigating individuals to perceptively grasp and detect what ‘stands out’, thus making it relevant for criminal investigation. Since the general attorney often turns down investigation procedures due to *lack of substantial evidence* the sensibility attending to such ‘outstanding’ conspicuous events demands more than just observing the rules of investigation. What is called for and what can have a persuasive impact on the prosecution authorities is to meet the (apparent) lack of evidence through a reasonable account of the probable causes underlying conspicuous matters. For the criminal police work this means reconstructing their rationality on the basis of *common sense knowledge and experience* [P1: 1146-1155].

As the facts of corrupt conduct are saturated with social perceptions and follow various rationalities (for example of economic ethics, or certain behavioural patterns) they can be accounted for by an investigative approach that takes its bearings from common sense experience. This has of course immediate consequences for both the cooperation between the investigation and prosecution authorities and the work of the criminal police itself as well. As regards the former, the tensions that sometimes occur refer to the fact that the initial suspicion either

- a) cannot be backed up by a persuasive account of probable causes or
- b) proves to be a too thin basis for the attorney to call for institutional action.

This need not only appear objectively unavoidable given the lack of evidence, but can have subjective causes in the sense that the attorney himself/herself does not have the experience required to discern a sufficient basis to start with in the proof material supplied by the criminal investigator [P1: 1197-1203]. In this way what holds true for the criminal investigator, should also be valid in the case of the general attorneys: *they must both be able to embed their perceptions of corrupt conduct in the legal framework and, conversely, widen the scope of applicability of the latter in view of the former.*

As concerns the investigative work of the criminal police itself tensions arise at various points. For one thing fighting corruption is the most laborious and cumbersome of all criminal investigations [P1: 1104-1105]. Furthermore, owing to the complexity and long duration of prosecuting economic criminality it is often the case that the relation between input (investigation, judicial prosecution, court proceedings) and output (verdict, sanctions) is so disproportionate that one cannot but think that justice is not always the final result [P2: 135-140]. Moreover, another fact also has certain consequences on the work ethic of the criminal investigators. In connection with an evaluation system that favours quantitative outcomes thus reminding us of the economic imperatives of raising efficiency, the investigators are increasingly coming under pressure to ‘deliver the goods’. Against the background of the cumbersome investigation process this may lead to frustration [P2: 891-897; 912-921].

In view of all this and keeping in mind the necessity of a structural investigative approach the tensions accompanying fighting corruption can be summed up in the need to bring together

- a) what is perceived to be sufficient evidence in the institutional framework of investigation/prosecution procedures, and
- b) the human resources required to stand up to the institutional demands of (detecting and) preventing corruption.



This latter demand follows immediately from the strenuous character of the criminal investigations by the police. Nevertheless, despite all the complexities and the long duration it is clear from a the structural anti-corruption approach that the demand of efficient prevention can be fulfilled only through the specific qualities of the human resources invested in the investigation/prosecution processes. Apart from the aforementioned ability to use common sense experience in order to identify the ‘logic’ of the case [P1: 811-814; 1566-1570] two of the indispensable qualities investigation officers must have are:

- a) *Commitment*. As the structural approach demands a great amount of time and persistent energy, the individuals involved must be resolutely willing to carry out the laborious task of low profile detection and subsequently reconstruction of the case to be submitted to the general attorney [P1: 1571-1577]. Identifying oneself with the strenuous duties arising from investigations that span over years goes beyond the purely professional commitment. What is additionally called for is
- b) *Passion*. A passionate attitude is necessary not only regarding the creativity needed in order to set together the pieces of the ‘puzzle’ (structural approach, meticulous reconstruction), but also in view of the fact that in no other field of criminal investigations is there so much denial of wrong-doing. Here the persistence to prove the contrary can only be sustained by passion [P1: 1449].

Conclusion

Detection of probable causes, experience requirements, special skills to reconstruct the ‘logic’ of the case: All point to and comply with the notion of corruption transcending what is merely codified as a legally sanctionable offence. If corruption encompasses various types of social action and individual motivation, then accounting for it means in regard to police investigation work that the institutional actors owe to strive *to translate* their common sense experience of suspicious regularities in operationalisable material evidence of wrong-doing, so that this can be a sufficient evidence basis for the prosecution authorities. If one adds to that the tenacity and passion that should be invested in the investigation work, it becomes obvious that what is called for is a certain supplementation of the institutional role playing by skills that bear upon a type of knowledge not directly emerging from the groundwork of the procedures of investigation/prosecution.



GREECE

TG III POLICE

General Comments

Police was one of the TGs with which we had serious difficulties in accessing them, either due to formal prerequisites we had to fulfil (written application, sending questionnaires, approval of interview), or work overload and meeting arrangement. The interview with the Service was very formal and carried out with no use of recorder corresponding to its wish. The meeting with the Police's trade unionist was fruitful and loose/relaxed.

Evaluation Units

P14 TG POLICE_DEY

P15 TG POLICE_PFPS

Interviews' Analysis

According to our interviewees corruption is a wide¹ area with various forms, exactly like organized crime², whereby the corrupt attribute to certain activities (and cases) is an issue of interpretation. They remain loyal to the legal concept as defined in the criminal law, yet, all three describe it as social 'phenomenon'³, oscillating between a sociological approach (social 'phenomenon') and a medical one (social 'sickness').

In our discussion the Service of Internal Affairs (DEY) used for its argumentation the national legislation⁴ and the definition of the European Council⁵. DEY's focus on the above definition was expected, not only because of its authority and inspective role, but also due to the formal interviewing; one police officer was reading answers to our questionnaire and commenting from time to time with the presence of her superior who was free to participate whenever he thought it was necessary. In general the Service was concentrated on the normative context of anticorruption policy.

The other interviewee, from the Police Servants' Federation is very sceptical about the international definitions and consequently the policies used. He adopts a constructivist approach, stressing the different interpretations of the same fact or activity ('everything is an issue of interpretation')⁶, according to which the term corruption is strongly related with the peculiarities of each society the offenders' group and the formulation of charges. His discourse is free, his view open for discussion and unconventional, since he doesn't have the same official reservations with the officers of DEY. Moreover, his position as representative

¹ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 5.

² P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 56, 57.

³ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 92; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 76.

⁴ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 2.

⁵ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 2, 15.

⁶ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 57.



of low-ranking police officers, mainly those on the beat justifies his loose attitudes and the quality of his discourse⁷.

In any case, both sides distinguish between ‘petty’ and ‘grand’ corruption⁸, according to a) the social groups involved⁹, and b) the amount of money used¹⁰, or the services exchange. Petty corruption is related to lower and middle social strata as ‘survival’ strategy to the difficulties of life, while grand corruption with those at the top of the socio-economic pyramid.

Moreover, we came upon an official and an unofficial discourse on corruption. The first is expressed by the officers of the Directorate of Internal Affairs and the second by the Police Union’s representative. Their institutional role corresponds to their different approach and openness to the researchers. Although the representatives of DEY don’t dispute its existence in society, its limits are defined narrower, than by the other interviewee. The Union’s representative regards corruption in society as ‘usual’ social behaviour. But he refers rather to a general behaviour, not corresponding to approved social – moral standards, than to illegal practices. Nevertheless, both sides didn’t show any special concern about corruption in police, and they generally agree about policy measures for dealing with it.

For one interviewee corruption in society is expanded, claiming that ‘Greek society acclimatized itself to corruption and bribery’¹¹. Corruption characterizes the social behaviour¹², therefore he is pessimistic about the chances of recovery.

Although the other interviewees don’t dispute the existence of the problem¹³ ‘in all social classes, as well as in public services’¹⁴, its limits are defined narrower¹⁵ than the Union’s representative. Their view is opposed to the generalization that corruption is ‘an extensive and diffuse problem’ justifying in the mean time their efforts to control it. According to DEY, generalisations due to failing statistics¹⁶ and other valid data¹⁷, along with the over-presentation by mass media¹⁸ during the last decade, have created a false image about the seriousness and size of the problem in Greece.

DEY is trying to move and put the blame on Greek society, not always successfully, countering that most of the citizens criticize and disapprove corruption¹⁹. It is the only group, which didn’t throw the baby with the pool.

⁷ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 125, 130, 131.

⁸ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODE 141.

⁹ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODE 13; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 52-56, 58.

¹⁰ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 14, 95, 96; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 49.

¹¹ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 100,101.

¹² P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 3, 99.

¹³ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 40.

¹⁴ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 52.

¹⁵ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 11-14, 24, 43.

¹⁶ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 13.

¹⁷ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 14.

¹⁸ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 12.

¹⁹ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 132; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 7.



All three interviewees see international and European cooperation in the field (organized crime included) useful²⁰ and necessary due to the globalization²¹, despite the bureaucratic difficulties of coordination²².

The interviewees attribute (mainly the Union's representative) corruption initially to Greek society's superstructure, affected its legal, social, cultural and political institutions; he used often terms such as *mentality*²³, *historical and cultural residues*²⁴, still without further specification. By that, he tries to explain the development of collective attitudes, various concepts and interpretations of corrupt practices, as well as their control in different societies. Under the above point of view he refers further to the organizational structure of the state and the public administration. Bureaucracy, overregulation and complex legislation²⁵ are considered to be the main reasons for corruption²⁶.

The *institutions' crisis* (delegitimation) is overstated in the discourse and is seen as cause and result of corruption in Greece. Its extent though, is not considered the same for Union's representative and DEY's officers. According to the first, crisis is general²⁷ followed by an overall scorn for the state, police included²⁸. DEY from its side, attempts (without disputing it) to decrease its extent and intensity²⁹. The police officers promote the idea that it is either a media construction³⁰, or the result of insufficient information of the citizens³¹, maintaining for example that police is highly appreciated³².

Furthermore, corruption is related to *personality's formation*³³ (character etc.), a view advanced by the Union's interviewee³⁴. Similarly, although less striking, DEY refers to 'elastic-conscience'³⁵ and 'personality'³⁶ (meaning opportunism and profiteering).

After all, it is worth mentioning that police's approach was not consistent with a *social analysis* of corruption which seemed to follow, especially the one of the Federation. The system is not as strong as initially the Union representative presented, since whatever behaviour a person follows, it is, according to him, the result of *rational choice* and *free*

²⁰ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 63, 64; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 18.

²¹ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 17.

²² P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 65, 66, 58, 59.

²³ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 2, 7.

²⁴ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 102.

²⁵ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 50.

²⁶ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 4, 104; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 50, 62.

²⁷ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 22-24.

²⁸ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 29-31, 33.

²⁹ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 22, 24, 33, 43.

³⁰ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 25.

³¹ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 30, 31.

³² P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 34.

³³ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 5, 15, 87, 137.

³⁴ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 2, 4, 83-86, 89, 136.

³⁵ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 47.

³⁶ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 39.



will³⁷, even though he is aware of the ‘injustices of the system’ and their role to corrupt exchanges³⁸.

Strong hierarchical structures of organisation followed by heavy bureaucracy³⁹ and low wages⁴⁰, contribute along with the *anonymity* afforded in big cities⁴¹ and increase of illegal opportunities⁴² to corrupt practices of police officers.

Nevertheless, both sides estimate corruption in police to be limited and in any case, not higher than in other public services⁴³; yet, it is implied that the ‘famous’ *esprit de corps* operates against the clearance of such cases in the police force⁴⁴. Furthermore, the *low interest of the leadership* (political and natural) in the financial situation of police officers, and their everyday problems⁴⁵, but above all its ‘failure to inspire and represent the officers’⁴⁶ results in its delegitimation⁴⁷. In our discussion the interviewee of the Federation distinguishes among the rank and file of the corps and notes a discriminatory treatment in the police, such as the ‘preferential treatment’⁴⁸ of the Service of Internal Affairs not only in cases of corruption but also in their higher remuneration. With this, according to our interviewee, the leadership acknowledges where the core problem is for the ordinary police officers.

DEY’s approach however, is very cautious because of its institutional role and position. It does not question leadership’s interests in fighting corruption (in general) and mentions several times to the improvements in corruption control, exactly because of the good cooperation with the leadership⁴⁹.

Both groups view the institution of the Service of Internal Affairs as innovation, corresponding to their long demand for diminishing corruption in the police⁵⁰. Yet, its efficiency is downplayed due to its bureaucratic structure⁵¹ and its subordination to the police leadership⁵².

Our interviewees relate the causes of corruption in Greece with the policy measures against it. They agree that its full elimination is impossible, not because of its extent but of its normality

³⁷ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 92.

³⁸ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 110, 111, 118-121.

³⁹ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 28, 50, 51, 94, 95.

⁴⁰ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 16; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 55.

⁴¹ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 18.

⁴² He associates some forms of corruption with organized crime, mainly trafficking and drug trafficking, imported and expanded from the ex communist countries P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 62.

⁴³ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 83, 103.

⁴⁴ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 35, 36, 39; P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 134, 135.

⁴⁵ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 34-39.

⁴⁶ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 40.

⁴⁷ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 46-49.

⁴⁸ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 70, 72.

⁴⁹ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 14, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31.

⁵⁰ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 74, 78.

⁵¹ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 79-81.

⁵² P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 73-76.



and its sources in outdated ‘established mentalities’⁵³. They stress on *prevention* instead of *suppression and control*⁵⁴, on education and socialisation of a *new citizen type*⁵⁵ (referred as investment in social structures)⁵⁶. Whatever policy on this background needs long-term planning⁵⁷ and time for its outcomes⁵⁸.

In addition, they suggest administrative reform⁵⁹, modernisation of public services, modernisation of justice in order to increase its effectiveness⁶⁰ justice’s speedup, use of swift and exemplary sentences⁶¹, emphasis on prevention⁶², limiting of public servant’s discretionary authority in dealing with specific cases⁶³. All accept that each citizen has a key role against corruption. What are missing in the suggested measures of our interviewees are those pertaining to the police.

⁵³ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 55, 113, 115; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 6, 63.

⁵⁴ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 42, 43; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 65.

⁵⁵ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 112-116.

⁵⁶ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 42.

⁵⁷ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 113; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 63.

⁵⁸ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 115.

⁵⁹ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 75.

⁶⁰ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 73.

⁶¹ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 44, 67, 68.

⁶² P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 74.

⁶³ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 67.



UNITED KINGDOM

Target Group Police

Interviewee: A Detective Superintendent

The Detective Superintendent enunciated one of the broadest definitions of corruption offered by our interviewees, not restricted to financial gain:

“Corruption for us is when any individual gains some advantage as a result of their position; advantage for themselves or for somebody else. Any its generally around what is plain to see as completely unfair: unfair competition, obtaining money or status”.

For the interviewee, allegations of corruption were easily made but extremely risky for the police because of their potential to undermine criminal trials (if you can link any police officer involved with corruption, the defendants will undoubtedly walk free).

It was also emphasised that the police govern by consent and are trusted by the public; Britain has the lowest ratio of police officers to members of the public in the EU, and is a largely unarmed force. The reputation of the police is therefore “central” to their effective functioning. The high reputation of the police is in some ways a double bind, however, because a higher standard of proof is required to prosecute police officers for corruption. There is no cultural acceptance of police corruption, and people are more than willing to complain if the situation arises (which helps to limit corruption) (code family 4).

The media is seen as helpful at times, but they are seen as having their own agenda that can lead to negative outcomes for the police, e.g. they can often draw attention and link separate cases of police corruption, which damages the reputation of the police.

The Detective Superintendent suggests that “the corrupter” would be external to the police force, corrupting the police, but explains that the police is drawn from the community, and since corruption is part of human nature, some individuals who join the police will have corrupt intentions. Corrupters are generally regarded as stemming from the world of organised crime.

There is deemed to be a real separation of powers between the government, legislature and police, but the fact that there is political will to fight police corruption is helpful in giving the independent police anti-corruption body the freedom to act widely.

British police officers know that their organisation runs secret integrity tests on them, which is an incentive for them to report corrupt behaviour. The interviewee argues that the success in keeping corruption down within the police force is due to the resources and effort dedicated to tackling the issue.

The interviewee acknowledges that in other countries, low police pay and general public acceptance may mean that bribery and corruption are common occurrences, but argues that widespread corruption undermines the economy, thereby indicating underlining the negative



implications of corruption. The interviewee suggests that other countries can improve their anti-corruption efforts by using the best detectives to fight police corruption, involving prosecutors, and having firm political backing. Independent oversight is also required, as with the completely independent police complaints body. Witnesses need to be protected. Supervision and undercover methods are key to limiting corruption in the police force.